Security, Community, Protest:
Local Impacts of Military Bases in Cold War Italy

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Abstract

This paper aims to provide an approach to the study of local impacts of military bases and public responses to them. It will focus on the causes, contents and effects of protest that is engendered by the presence of military bases. The analysis will focus on two historical case studies, both situated in Cold War Italy: the Camp Darby base near Livorno in Tuscany in 1952-1963, and the Sigonella base on Sicily in 1978-1985. The paper proposes hypotheses on the interactions between local responses to military bases, national security debates, and foreign policy formulations.

Theoretically, the paper aims to contribute to the literature on “critical security”, which proposes alternative notions of security to the ones employed by policy-makers or in mainstream academia, and understands security in terms of public experiences and from a bottom-up perspective. Protest is understood as resulting from changes in public understandings of security, or changes in the boundaries of what is perceived as the security community, the site of shared interests.

The paper furthermore aims to contribute to the social history of the Cold War, and how the Cold War affected local politics, political identities, and social movements in the West European context. It will look at the ways in which national security consensuses are constructed and deconstructed and the moments at which this happens. In this regard, questions of change and continuity from the “first” to the “second” Cold War will be addressed.
Protected Areas and Peaceful Protest
Trident and the New Scottish National Park System

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Abstract

This paper begins by asserting the well-established role of non-violent direct action in the formation of public policy on UK protected landscapes. Best known of these is the 1932 Mass Trespass of Kinder Scout. This contributed significantly to the 1949 National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act which initiated Britain’s system of National Parks and other protected landscapes. Continued pressure ‘from below’ has been a major and continuing influence in the development of UK rural policy. A recent example is the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, which has established, south of the border, the ‘right to roam’ in open countryside, bringing the rest of Britain in line with Scots tradition in this respect. One consequence of the development of UK policy is that National Parks, initially conceived as a means of delivering recreational opportunity to a largely urbanised population, are now seen as a model for sustainable rural development, characterised by ‘harmonious interaction’ of people with their environment. This adds a new dimension to the long standing debate over the appropriateness of military activity in such protected landscapes. Faslane is sandwiched between biologically recreationally important areas, typified by Argyll Forest Park to the west, and Loch Lomond and (beyond this) Queen Elizabeth Forest Park to the east. Yet Faslane and its surrounding area are excluded from the Loch Lomond and Trossachs National Park designated in 2002 – implicit recognition of their incompatibility with the principles of environmental, economic and social sustainability. The Scottish Executive is currently consulting on what, when it is established, will be the UK’s first coastal and marine national park. Gare Loch and its associated sea lochs – all intensively used for military activity - form part of one of the ten candidate areas for the new park, although unlikely to make it through to the final. If protected areas prefigure a vision for a peaceful and sustainable future, the protests at Faslane can be seen as part of the effort to achieve it in the British countryside, as well as in the wider World.
Gender and the Nuclear Weapons State: A Feminist Critique of the British Government’s White Paper on Trident

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Abstract

This paper enquires into the connections between gender and discourses of the nuclear weapons state. Specifically, we offer a feminist analysis of the ways in which gender operates in the White Paper published by the British Government in 2006 on its plans to renew Trident nuclear weapons. We argue that the White Paper mobilises masculine-coded language and symbols in three main ways. First, although it draws less than might have been expected on a masculine discourse of technological potency, it nonetheless evacuates the concrete, embodied reality of nuclear weapons, and clings to the masculinised status that nuclear possession brings with it—albeit juggling this with more ethically based claims to leadership. Second, the White Paper is based on an understanding of security which assumes that invulnerability is achieved through technology rather than through relationships, and which privileges the masculine protector over the feminised protected—although it remains unclear who we are being protected from and there is an apparent reluctance in taking on the protector role. Third, the White Paper is underpinned by a view of the state-as-actor which has a strongly masculine character in its emphasis on a narrow rationality and on independent action—although there is an implied contrast here with more aggressive forms of masculinity and significant tensions with regard to the more multilateral and dependent relations glimpsed in the text. Taken together, these three gendered logics function to construct a masculinised identity for the British nuclear state as a ‘responsible steward’. However, this identity is one that is not yet securely fixed and that, indeed, contains serious internal tensions that opponents of Trident (and of the nuclear state more generally), should be able to exploit.
Executive Summary

**Background to Trident Deployment:** nuclear-armed Polaris submarines were first based at Faslane in 1968. The agreement with the US for the supply of Trident missiles was signed in 1982. Deployment at Faslane was opposed by the STUC, COSLA, the Labour Party and the SNP.

**Costs of Trident Replacement to Scotland:** the annual cost to Scotland of Trident replacement is estimated as £238m (in 2007 prices – which are used throughout unless otherwise stated). This sum combines Scotland’s £85m share of the £1bn annual procurement costs with its £153m a year share of the existing and continuing operating costs of Trident. The government White Paper states that the investment required for Trident replacement will not come at the expense of the conventional capabilities of the armed forces and will be allocated as part of the Comprehensive Spending Review. This indicates that the investment cost for Trident replacement will either be at the expense of other public expenditure or through additional tax. Scotland's £85m annual contribution to the £1bn a year investment costs would either result in less public services or a higher tax take. Up to 3,000 public sector jobs could be at risk. Of the current £153m annual operating costs approximately £50m comes back to Scotland in terms of wages for those maintaining Trident or the Scottish service personnel staffing Trident. If Trident were cancelled the entire £153m annual Scottish contribution to the operating costs would be available for arms conversion and developing alternative employment for these workers.

**Current employment infrastructure:** the maintenance infrastructure for Trident is split between the Atomic Weapons Establishment, Aldermaston (warheads), Devonport (submarine refit and reactor refuelling), the United States (missile supply and maintenance) and Faslane (logistics base, service and maintenance). The Faslane base is RN headquarters for Scotland, Northern Ireland and Northern England and also services the Swiftsure class nuclear-powered submarines, minesweepers and other surface vessels. Only 30 per cent of the civilian workforce is related to Trident. Of the total direct and indirect civilian employment dependent on Trident across Britain 9.1 per cent is currently located in Scotland.

**Skill Profile of Trident-related jobs at Faslane and the consequences of cancellation:** 859 civilian jobs directly dependent on Trident would become redundant between 2022 and 2027. The main skill groups would be MoD police and security (360), outfitting and steel work (240), technical and supervisory mainly in shipbuilding related areas (70) and clerical (70). If, however, Trident was decommissioned early to coincide with the build up of Astute class nuclear submarines at Faslane to a total of six by 2018, and thereby avoiding the need to increase the workforce to service ten submarines between 2018 and 2022, the level
of job losses could be reduced mainly to security staff between 2016 and 2018. Few Scottish manufacturing jobs are likely to be jeopardised by a decision not to build a new Trident submarine – at most 150. The number of potential Scottish job openings at risk, civilian and military, direct, indirect and induced, from Trident cancellation in 2022-2027 is estimated as 2,027. The number of civilian jobs would be 1,727.

**The Local Economy: Indirect and induced employment consequences**  
Studies of military base closure in England show an employment multiplier of 0.3 for the locality impact of full base closure. Studies of base closure in the United States show the importance of statutory government responsibility for early action to ensure local job creation. A review of the local Argyll and Bute economy indicates that its current economic performance is somewhat stronger than the Scottish average. The West Dunbartonshire economy is somewhat weaker but less exposed to any reduction in the operation of the base.

**Scotland’s future skill requirements**  
The Scottish Executive estimates a need to replace 95,000 in skilled trades in engineering, manufacturing and mining over the next decade. Renewable energy and energy conservation is predicted to require a significant increase in skills cognate with those at Faslane. On the other hand, there would be a real opportunity cost to Scotland in diverting skilled workers to Trident replacement.

**Redeployment in the public and social economy**  
It is proposed that the 300 Scottish-originating service personnel associated with Trident be continued in conventional naval employment at a cost of £10m a year. The Scottish Executive and local authorities should be funded to absorb up to 300 of the personnel released from Faslane, in particular for the police service, at a cost of £10m. It is further proposed that the local authorities and social economy sector be funded to absorb directly another 600 direct or indirect job losses in the development of general infrastructure, tourist amenities and to develop local community-based energy generation projects. This would cost a further £20m

**Redeployment, arms conversion and investment in the productive economy**  
Both the Scottish Executive and the British government are committed to ambitious targets for carbon emission reduction. This will involve the use of a range of technologies for the conservation of energy, energy efficiency and the development of renewable energy. These technologies will either have to be imported, as is largely the case at present, or developed and manufactured in Scotland. It is argued that the development of relevant technologies represents the biggest opportunity for productive investment likely to be available this generation and would build on existing skills and scientific expertise. It is proposed that Government support for this opportunities be radically increased, bringing new employment to Scotland in manufacturing both for domestic and foreign markets. Further, that workers are financially supported during this process as part of a Just Transition programme.

**Policy Implementation**  
Over 40,000 Scottish defence-related jobs have been shed since 1990 without significant government intervention to ensure the provision of alternative employment. For the decommissioning of Trident it is proposed that an Arms Conversion Agency be established to oversee the creation of alternative employment. This would oversee both local redeployment programmes and the development of technologies relevant to the energy field.
Pierre Bourdieu, Donald MacKenzie and Tacit Knowledge: Why Knowledge of Nuclear Fission Might Not be Like "Original Sin"

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No abstract available
Emerging Social Movements and Their Impacts. The Antimilitary and Peace Networks in Spain

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Abstract

Over the last decade, the traditional patterns of government are shifting towards new forms of governance. On the collective action side, big parties are increasingly becoming machines for the reproduction of institutional power, with very limited social roots. The new social movements are being transformed as well, and giving way to a range of emerging critical networks. These can be considered as social movements to the extent that they are aimed at social change on the base of alternative, non-dominant social values, and develop non-conventional and irruptive social practices. However, they should be considered a new generation of critical collective action, since these networks open a new agenda (against globalisation, war, racism or urban authoritarianism...), are further from the traditional left-wing culture of political affiliation.

In our paper, these assumptions will lay the foundations for the analysis of the antimilitary and antiwar movement in Spain, mainly in Catalonia, over the period ranging from the early 90s until the massive mobilisations against the Irak war in 2003. The antimilitary network was based on a limited number of activists with radical frames, who succeeded in bridging with widespread anti-authoritarian social values. The movement reached a relevant political victory: the abolition, by the late 90s, of the compulsory military service in Spain. The antimilitary network shifted very rapidly into a wider movement for peace and against the war. Radical activists were replaced by a great number of communities of critical collective action, and stronger links were set up with a vast majority of the population. Social mobilisations not only provoked the electoral defeat of the right-wing government in 2004, but also provided a solid social power to force the decision of withdrawal of the Spanish troops from Irak.

To sum up, two relevant impacts on the defence policy agenda: the abolition of the military service and the withdrawal from Irak, both following different, emerging and successful patterns of critical collective action.
Military Research: Ethics, Values and Academic Freedom

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Abstract

The nature of universities is changing, with increasing pressures towards the commercialisation of both education and teaching. At the same time, in the UK and the USA in particular, military spending is increasing and military work can provide both relatively plentiful funding and interesting and challenging problems. However, military work raises questions of academic freedom, diverts resources from other important areas, such as global warming, and can distort the balance between research in the arts and humanities and in science, engineering and technology. Military research on the development of increasingly sophisticated weapons also supports and perpetuates existing power imbalances between different nations and diverts attention from more holistic approaches to understanding and removing sources of armed conflict, including peace building and global sustainable development. It also raises a number of ethical questions, as well as questions of the role of research and the associated values. This brief paper will discuss these issues.
Trident and the Scottish Public: Who Thinks What About It?

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Abstract

Based on survey data collected at the time of the Scottish elections in 2007, this paper is about public opinion towards the British government's decision to replace Trident. First, I investigate the impact of the campaign on attitudes to Trident, noting that a fairly stable aggregate picture conceals considerable change in opinions at the individual level. Evidence that many minds are not yet made up is obviously important for those - like us - seeking to influence public opinion on this issue, and so I look at the characteristics of those who are yet undecided. Then, turning to those respondents who did report an attitude, I assess the capacity of various social, demographic and political variables to predict whether those people are for or against Trident. Finally, I discuss the relationship between attitudes to Trident and party support, and present evidence that - despite the decision on Trident being a matter for the Westminster government - the issue had a marked impact on vote choice in the 2007 Scottish Parliament elections.
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terror, and Human Security

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Introductory Paragraphs:

I believe that we are in the midst of a profound shift in the security paradigm – both in the nature of the threats or risks that we face and in our responses to them. It was a shift that began after World War II and the subsequent determination to avoid another war. The UN Charter called on the world’s nations to ‘end the scourge of war which has brought untold suffering to mankind.’ The Cold War, however, kept alive the traditional paradigm, the idea of a grand conflict between blocs and nations at least in our imagination. And it was only after the Cold War that an alternative language of humanitarianism, civil society, or human security came to compete with the more conventional language of geo-politics.

In this lecture, I want to argue that the dominant approaches both to weapons of mass destruction and to terrorism are embedded in the traditional security approach and are therefore very dangerous. I will focus on weapons of mass destruction and concepts like arms control or what President Bush calls counter-proliferation. But the same argument can be made in relation to the Global War on Terror, which reproduces the narrative of World War II and the Cold War and the tools which accompany the narrative. What is needed is a new approach, based on human security.
In Defence of the ‘Others’ – Why I Am Here

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Personal Statement

I was born, Rebecca Schmidt and my first and most painful experiences of being ‘the other’ centre around growing up ‘half’ German in Britain. For much of my childhood I felt surrounded by stereotypes of Germans as ‘Nazis’, ‘bad people’, (at best) ‘selfish, arrogant, unkind people’, nothing like the people I loved and who I knew as ‘good’, ‘principled’, ‘funny’ and who loved me.

I learned as a child to recognise that if a character in a film had a German accent they were almost certain to turn out to be ‘baddies’ and not to survive until the end of the film. In war films I saw German soldiers portrayed as characterless, inhumane clones, not quirky, loveable, flawed and human like their British or American adversaries.

Often I felt that my only escape from people’s assumptions was to explain my grandparents involvement in the resistance, my grandmother’s imprisonment, my great-uncle’s incredible escape from a death row in a Nazi prison. It seemed equally important to avoid mentioning my dad’s compulsory membership of the Hitler youth and drafting into the German army at the age of 13.

But as I grew up I came to wonder, what if anything does this say about me and what difference would it make to ‘being me’ if my German relatives had in fact been members of the Nazi party? Would I love my dad less? Would I be less of a good person? Would our annihilation be justified?

Perhaps it is no coincident that I ended up studying another important historical ‘other’ – Russia and the USSR.

Cold war politics on both sides of the ‘iron curtain’ depended on the ‘othering’ and ‘dehumanising’ of the countries, cultures and people on the other side. Even in a song protesting the stand-off of the cold war and drawing attention to the danger it presented to people on both sides, Sting sang ‘I hope the Russians love their children too’, as though this love for children was a natural given for ‘us’, but possibly not for ‘ them’. As a Russian friend of mine said a couple of years back, ‘the iron curtain wasn’t on the borders of countries it was inside us, it was in our minds and our hearts, because we were so frightened of you’.

It is both frightening and horribly fascinating to me the way in which the current political shifts in the relationship between Russia and the US/EU are accompanied by a renewed process of othering. Representations of Russia as a ‘wild’, ‘frightening’ and ‘uncivilised’ place, where people are somehow ‘fundamentally different’ from us, unable to understand democracy and freedom, ‘naturally inclined’ to irresponsibility, cruelty and a disregard for human rights.
And yet, after travelling to Russia very regularly for over 15 years now, living there and researching people’s experiences and lives, I find myself, again looking at a set of representations that have nothing in common with the people I care for very deeply, the resourcefulness and humanity of the many individuals and communities I have worked with and studied, their sense of humour, patience and determination to survive. These are some of the many things about the Russian people which I enjoy and value.

There is another place and people, whom we are encouraged to fear as ‘fanatics’, ‘barbarous’ and ‘inhumane’ and whom we are told hate us, but whom I have been privileged to know better and to live amongst. When I was a young child my family spent three years living in Iran. My memories of that time are hazy, but my parents talk continually about it as one of their happiest times and speak with great fondness and respect of my Dad’s Iranian colleagues, and of our Iranian neighbours in downtown Tehran. What I do remember is the teenage son of the family next door, who used to sneak chocolate coated ice-lollies to my brother and I across the balcony. The families who would dance around food laden blankets during impromptu picnics at the side of the road. The hospitality of a mechanics family, who took us in one night on the road back from Darband, when the exhaust pipe had fallen off our car. A group of young men who followed us down a snowy mountain path, me on my dad’s shoulders, throwing their snowballs back at them as they chanted my name. ‘Re-Be-Cca! Re-Be-Cca!’ This was not a people hell-bent on destroying us – they were friendly, curious, kind, proud and dignified.

‘Othering’ and how it works is an important theme in lots of my research and teaching, but for me, Faslane and the nuclear ‘deterrent’ is a horrendous culmination of this process, into an othering that makes the annihilation of the ‘other’ possible in its most literal sense. Mutually Assured Destruction which aims at the mass murder of millions of civilians, can only be contemplated if we ignore the common humanity and complexity, the hopes, dreams, fears and pain of those on the ‘other side’. During the 1980s my family and I took part every year in the big CND demonstrations at Easter. My friends and I at school talked a lot about the nuclear threat and disarmament. We were almost all agreed that multilateral disarmament was a good idea, but I was more isolated in my support for unilateralism. And yet, I was convinced, that even if it were true that without nukes we are vulnerable to being bombed, it would be better to die knowing that people elsewhere in the world were alive, than to die knowing that ‘our’ bombs were killing those people too. This still seems to me the only logical position to take, unless we accept the representation of those people as inhuman, expendable ‘others’, whose lives are less valuable, less precious, less meaningful than our own.
How does Progressive Social Change Happen?  
Or: What Should We Do Next?  

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Introductory Paragraphs

What might be the next steps for those of us who see the retention of nuclear weapons and the war of terror as making the world a far more dangerous place? What might be the next steps for those of us who are against the appalling impoverishment of billions and environmental devastation that the tornado of market ‘greed logic’ lets loose on men, women, children and other non-human beings who (like us) otherwise appreciate being alive?

In other words, how does progressive social change happen?
No Names, No Faces, No Leaders: The Risible Rise and Rise of CIRCA, an Obscene Army of the Deviant, Dangerous and - er – Deeply Democratic!

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Abstract

The Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army (CIRCA) presents an absurd about-face of resistance to the militaristic coercive forces of the state. Being 'in-Clown' is neither pretence nor disguise, it is the embodiment and enactment of one’s inner clown. Clowns negotiate identity to subvert and reconstruct spaces of power and resistance in imaginative and organised ways. Via the twin principles of spontaneity and complicity, Clowns resist as, at once, innovative individuals and a consensual collective. Clowns highlight and so make ridiculous the gross imbalance between the practice of state domination and activist resistance, thereby perhaps loosening the knot. Exploiting always perceptions of the identity of the clown, and transcending such perceptions, Clowns transgress conceptual and spatial boundaries. In encounters with Clowns, the state’s enforcers are unsettled and made to feel out of place. Participating in performances of resistance in place yields narratives of the Clown discourse of identity. Such Clown narratives are gathered and told, retold and mythologized from our statements and the practices with which we inhabit social space. The tale presented here has a twist in the tail, however: Meet paragon of participation, defender of diversity, the deeply democratic and ridiculously responsible - Citizen Clown!
Basic Technical Explanation of Iran's Nuclear industry

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Abstract

Iran's Nuclear industry is discussed at length in the media as the US constantly uses it as an excuse for sanctions and possible military action. This short paper will explain the state of Iran's nuclear industry.
Introductory Paragraphs:

As a teenager, learning about the Nazi Holocaust was a shocking experience. Like so many others, I was especially shocked to hear ordinary soldiers and workers saying, “I was only obeying orders!” But when I heard about the commander of one concentration camp, in which several thousand people were murdered, trying to explain his actions during the Nuremberg trials, I got really confused. He said that he had “never killed anyone” — that he had “only been giving orders”! These words have followed me ever since, disturbing my understanding of responsibility and complicity. During my visit to Auschwitz in Poland in the summer of 1989, they were especially haunting.

How is it possible to get normal and decent people to commit abnormal deeds without them protesting or even showing remorse? Why does it happen so often in human history? The sociological researcher Stanley Milgram showed in a classic experiment that obedience to authority — even when a person is asked to do clearly evil acts without the threat of punishment — is the foremost normal social reaction. Milgram performed his research on US citizens in an attempt to explain the horrors of Nazi Germany. His conclusions are still a great challenge to the “normal” citizens and the “free” societies of the western world. Criminal or immoral obedience is not performed by abnormal or sick people but by the ordinary, “normal” citizen.

In this article, I intend to explore these issues of power, law and obedience and relate them to the development of the existing practice of national democracy in the western world. My basic argument is that the development of democracy and the struggle against abuses of power strongly depends on a movement’s use of civil disobedience. Whereas our parents viewed obedience as a virtue, I would suggest that obedience is the root of evil — worse even than war or oppression, because it makes all these things possible. We have to reclaim individual and collective responsibility for what we do or choose not to do.
Trident and Star Wars – What Role for the UK?

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Abstract

The Trident nuclear weapons system was developed in the US as a first strike weapon. Trident missiles can be targeted extremely accurately – something that is not required if it were just to be used as a deterrent. The American National Missile Defence (NMD) or ‘Star Wars’ programme (if it worked) would enable a nuclear first strike to be carried out without fear of retaliation. The UK is a more than willing partner in the Trident and Star Wars systems and the US is risking the start of a new Cold War with Russia by establishing NMD bases in Central Europe. In addition, the US is surrounding China with new military bases and blocking attempts to reach an agreement on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament. This paper examines these worrying developments and suggests ways in which the UK could help prevent the further militarization of space and honour the commitment to nuclear disarmament it made when it became a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and work effectively to avoid the unthinkable possibility that nuclear weapons may actually be used once again.